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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
Responsibility-sharing for 
refugees (2)
Can global solutions avoid contributing to the legal 
production of superfluity?
I have argued in the previous post, how states’ regulation of 
borders and the global question of responsibility sharing 
relate: Not only does the securization of borders in one place 
shift responsibility for refugees to other states. Strategies of 
containment have shaped today’s international structure of 
protection much more generally, including the growing role 
of humanitarian actors and the corresponding expansion of 
humanitarian reason in reactions to displacement. These 
dynamics tend to construe refugees as “superfluous” in at 
least two ways: Firstly, the more access to territory is 
restricted, the more the need for such access becomes in 

itself problematic. Historically, it is the emergence of 
territorial borders and limitations to free movement, which 
give rise to the very concept of the refugee. But also on the 
level of today’s regulation of displacement, the restriction of 
access forms the ways in which forced 
migration concentrates in few places and directions. On a 
different level, the humanitarian reason in refugee 
protection contributes to a “production of superfluity”, in 
creating and relying on circumstances of dependence, in 
which persons are foremost recipients of aid.
Against this background, it appears important that the issue 
of responsibility-sharing is on the agenda for the upcoming 
UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants. The adoption of a 
Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing for Refugees is 
envisaged, and the state’s declaration will contain at least 
some references. Sure, there has been skepticism as to the 
willingness of heads of states to actually work towards real 
changes: Compared to the zero draft of the declaration, the 
draft following the high-level meeting already exhibits more 
hesitant formulations regarding the issue of responsibility-
sharing (cf. para. 6.v. of the zero draft as compared to 4.5 of 
the draft). Also the draft for the Global Compact has been 
criticized by refugee law scholars as remaining too vague and 
lacking substantial commitments. My focus here, however, 
will not be to assess prospects for September 19 , but to 
discuss how international agreements could actually be able 
to improve conditions of refugee rights and what pitfalls 
might thereby arise.
Putting the issue of responsibility-sharing at the center: 
proposals for global solutions
th
In that regard, two prominent proposals regarding “global 
solutions” for refugees are worth considering: James 
Hathaway has long emphasized the issue of responsibility-
sharing, arguing that the existing legal framework of the 1951 
Convention contains guidelines for international cooperation 
in refugee protection, and that the failure lies not in the lack 
of rules but in their implementation. Hathaway, in proposing 
“a global solution to a global refugee crisis”, maintains that 
successful governance of refugee protection must include 
more states, act in a more forward-looking manner, and 
allocate a greater role to international administration 
through UNHCR, which would make refugee status 
determination more effective. Hathaway’s five-point plan 
thereby builds on the idea of a “common but differentiated 
responsibility” of states for refugees, involving both financial 
burden-sharing, and responsibility-sharing in the sense of 
accepting persons through agreed quotas for resettlement.
In a similar direction points Alexander Aleinikoff’s Alexander 
Aleinikoff’s proposal for a Global Action Platform and Fund 
for Forced Migrants. While he does not view the 1951 
Convention to contain relevant guidance for the problem of 
responsibility-sharing, Aleinikoff shares the thrust of creating 
institutional mechanisms that allow planning ahead instead 
of the often stagnant responses of the international 
community to newly emerging or intensifying refugee 
situations. In particular, his proposal concurs with the idea to 
give more weight to centralized registration of refugees by 
UNHCR and a subsequent distribution through agreed 
resettlement quota. Aleinikoff also points to the steps that 
international institutions are beginning to take for improving 
the global structures of protection, in particular the creation 
of a “Solution Alliance”, which strives to work towards 
models of assistance that focus on refugee self-reliance and 
support hosting communities.
In light of the previous considerations about law’s production 
of superfluity, two aspects of those proposals appear central 
for a critical discussion: the stand they take on what actually 
forms the object of responsibility-sharing, and the impact 
that a centralization of responses has on the perceived role 
of border regulations and mobility of refugees.
Responsibility-sharing without a fixed object
The more than 65 million persons forcibly displaced world-
wide constitute the usual reference point for all 
considerations of responsibility-sharing. This number is 
determined from two sides: from the causes for persons 
becoming refugees, and from causes of persons remaining 
refugees. While the regular postulation to “address root 
causes” of displacement (cf. the draft declaration, 1.12) points 
to the former – the side of persons becoming refugees, we 
must also consider how legal arrangements impact, directly 
and indirectly, on the latter – the possibility to not remain a 
refugee. In that regard, the two forms of sharing 
responsibility that proposals for global solutions 
contain, financial contributions and accepting persons by 
way of resettlement or direct access, appear crucially 
different: While financial contributions are of courses needed 
in the immediate situation, a focus on financial contributions 
ultimately tends to uphold the current 
structural problems including the humanitarian reason in 
protection, which will at the same time keep persons in the 
status of refugees.
It is essential, in other words, to move beyond a 
perception that responsibility-sharing for refugees would 
concern a static mass to be distributed, i.e. a definite number 
of persons for whom the responsibility is to share. Rather, 
the ways law frames conditions of movement and integration 
contribute themselves to the object of responsibility-sharing 
itself. This also relates to the wider communicative aspects 
that border regulations and the willingness to accept 
refugees have between different parts of the world: Claims 
for local integration of refugees are likely to remain futile as 
long as refugees are concentrated in few places in the Global 
South, and as long as those states receiving the vast majority 
of refugees feel left alone with the task of integration. 
Whether refugees can become valuable to “economic and 
social development in their country of refuge and 
destination”, as in the multi-stakeholder hearing preparing 
the UN summit it was determinedly pointed out, will depend 
foremost on the possibility of persons to make choices about 
their country of refuge and destination – and thereby to take 
part in “distributing” the responsibility for refugees.
Centralization of responses – and the relevance of concrete 
border situations
This relates to the question, how endeavors for global 
solutions deal with the aspect of mobility: The principle of 
responsibility-sharing on the level of inter-state 
relations corresponds to the question of mobility on the level 
of refugees themselves and their relationship with states. 
Refugees in that sense take part in describing and shaping 
the global picture of protection in that they make decisions 
about where to go and react to unbearable conditions of 
shelter in one place by moving to another. At the same time, 
the restriction to mobility forms a key aspect of the refugee’s 
situation. Already at the very outset, “we are dealing”, to 
return to the quote of Arendt, “with a problem not of space 
but of political organization” (OT, 294).
Regarding legal efforts to improve the situation of refugees, 
the focus on mobility concerns firstly the way provisions for 
resettlement includes the possibility of persons to decide 
about destinations. More importantly, however, we must ask 
how a focus on centralization and the choices of financial 
contributions and resettlement as “currencies” tend to 
legitimize states’ efforts to secure borders and restrict 
mobility. The draft for the Global Compact on Responsibility 
Sharing for Refugees in that regard subsumes under the 
necessary measures for improving responsibility-sharing also 
the commitment to prevent not only the “need to flee” but 
also “need to move onwards” (point 9). Looking at the 
struggles of migrants exactly regarding the possibility to 
move onwards, this proposed commitment appears to 
reinforce rather than tackle the dominant strategies of 
containment as part of the problem.
I don’t think that centralized legal measures inescapably 
contribute to the “legal production of superfluity”. In some 
ways, international agreements might work to explicitly 
address mobility rights of refugees (cf. for an argument about 
a new version of Nansen Passports here). Yet they will not be 
sufficient alone, and they will certainly not “resolve” the 
issue. In that sense, the notion of global solutions highlights 
problems in both parts: The framing as solutions tends to 
abides by the logic that refugees form a temporary problem 
that one day will be resolved. From the complex 
intertwinement that the notion of the refugee has with the 
legitimacy framework of nation states and political 
membership more generally, this horizon of solution itself is 
questionable. The global in turn comes at the risk of shifting 
attention from concrete border situations to a more abstract 
commitment to design responses. It might be the 
concreteness of the border situation, however, which allows 
framing the question of refugees not as a humanitarian but as 
a political one.
This is the second part of two posts on the question of global 
responsibility-sharing. A first post has discussed the current 
dynamics in international refugee protection regarding 
the problem of responsibility-sharing and 
humanitarian reason.
Dana Schmalz is a co-editor of the blog and currently an 
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